PhasorSec: Protocol Security Filters for Wide Area Measurement Systems

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***Abstract*—The addition of synchrophasors to the power grid to improve observability comes at the cost of an increased attack surface: the wide area measurement system. A common source of zero-days, that can be used to exploit the system, is improper input validation. The strict availability and timing requirements of the grid make it critical that input validation be done right and in a timely fashion. PhasorSec is a hardened security filter for the synchrophasor communication protocol, C37.118. PhasorSec is built using language theoretic principles which treat all input as a language with a specific grammar that defines what input must be accepted. An open-source version of the prototype is provided and evaluation in terms of CPU-time show that it is possible to meet the strict latency requirements. Experiments also demonstrate its effectiveness against the state-of-the-art AFL fuzzer.**

I. Introduction

Phasor measurement units (PMUs) are being widely deployed by power grid transmission owners and generator owners with the primary goal of improving situational awareness about the grid. These measurement devices are part of a larger critical infrastructure: wide-area measurement systems (WAMS). WAMS include PMUs, phasor data concentrators (PDCs), central data concentrators (CDCs), GPS receivers and communication and the networking infrastructure to facilitate better planning and operation of power systems. The measurements collected by the PMUs are sent upstream to PDCs over a wide area network where they are processed and used by applications. Every application has a desired timing bound on the freshness of data it requires. While some applications, like transient stability, require access to near real time data, others like, postmortem analysis work with data that has been archived by the PDCs. Due to the real time abilities of PMUs, there are plans to integrate the infrastructure with the current control system of the grid, thus making security of the WAMS a high priority.

One of the primary tricks used by attackers to compromise devices is to find vulnerabilities in code that handles input. Regardless of how the code receives input, some processing on the input has to be done to make sure that the input is exactly as intended by the programmer. The lack of proper input recognition has commonly led to critical vulnerabilities like Heartbleed [1], where there was a particular length field that was not validated, enabling an attacker to read an arbitrary number of bytes from the buffer.

In the past, our investigation of current supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) protocols like DNP3 [2] revealed vulnerabilities in several implementations of the protocol by various vendors. Recently, vulnerabilities were found in implementations of the IEEE C37.118 [3], the most commonly used WAMS communication protocol. Operating on a malformed input can cause the device (PMU for example) to enter a unforeseen state which affects either the availability (device crash) or worse: increased privileges on the device for the attacker.

This paper presents the initial design and implementation of PhasorSec, an input validation filter for WAMS. PhasorSec is an ingress-based network appliance that inspects packets in the WAMS network for potentially malformed inputs. PhasorSec is designed to filter out inputs that might compromise any WAMS devices by making use of Language-theoretic Security (LangSec) principles. Language-theoretic Security is a field of security that focuses on validating and handling input safely, using the principles of formal language theory [4]. Essentially, the set of acceptable inputs is treated as a language with a known grammar. Only inputs that conform to the grammar are operated upon and everything else is either dropped or logged for analysis. Note that in this work the terms parser and filter are used interchangeably since the PhasorSec filter is essentially a hardened parser with added functionality to drop or log packets.

Several challenges exist in developing such a filter. We describe them and note the contributions of this work below.

- The IEEE specification of the C37.118 protocol [5] consists of verbose text, thus making it extremely hard and error-prone to implement a parser for the protocol. In this work, we provide an open source implementation

of the parser in C,[1] which is tested extensively against the state of the art AFL fuzzer.

- The protocol is also designed in a way that the PDC first receives a synchronization frame, and then receives a number of data frames that depend on the values in the synchronization frame. This dependency forces a validator to look at the state of the protocol stream, rather than look at the packets individually. Thus, such a filter would need to maintain state over multiple flows. There is a possibility of state space explosion and hence a concern over how much memory is available for the filtering process to maintain context. We mitigate this by building a finite state machine that only maintains state over what it expects to see given a certain input, thus conserving memory.
- Most ICS devices are comprised of proprietary software that cannot be modified without vendor involvement. This means long development cycles are needed to integrate hardened parsers into the device. PhasorSec is a bump in the wire solution that works independent of the vendor, thereby allowing flexible and timely deployment.
- Most power grid protocols prescribe a maximum permitted latency in the communication. Meeting these latency requirements and at the same time validating the input when the synchrophasor data that is collected at 60 to 240 measurements per second at the PDC becomes a challenging task. We build PhasorSec with stringent constraints and show that the overhead is a few microseconds. We also provide a mechanism to decide which network links are best suited to deploy PhasorSec such that the delay constraints are met.

It is important to note that PhasorSec filters don't match against an attack signature nor compare against a pattern of acceptable behavior, like in traditional intrusion detection systems, but match each packet and its contents on a grammar, and on the context of the packet based on the protocol state. PhasorSec filters keep track of the actual values in the configuration frames, and use them to make sure that the subsequent values are well-formed as well. Also, PhasorSec does not prevent against false data injections in protocols by default. While it protects cyber components against compromise, it does not consider how attackers can affect the power system given that PMUs have been compromised. However, it is possible to extend PhasorSec functionality to do so by integrating it with [6] for example. This would come at a higher overhead, which we do not discuss in this work.

II. Background and Related Work

A. Language-Theoretic Security

LangSec posits that the design of any software must begin with gathering the protocol state machine and the grammar of the protocol. In the past, we have looked at a similar approach for protocols in the Internet of Things for the MQTT and XMPP [7] and the SCADA/ICS DNP3 protocol [2].

The DNP3 implementation was built as a proxy, that would consume DNP3 packets asynchronously, and would run the parser on it offline. This design decision was made since the DNP3 parser induced latency. To avail the security benefits of having a parser protect a system from input handling vulnerabilities, the parsing has to be performed in real-time. Also, the DNP3 implementation looked at parsing separate packets, without regard for the protocol state. SCADA protocols are traditionally designed such that they rely on a previous packet for context. The MQTT and XMPP implementations perform the parsing synchronously, but add significant overheads due to parsing.

PhasorSec overcomes these shortcomings in the DNP3 and IoT implementations of LangSec. We build a placement tool and outsource the parsing to a separate device on the substation network to serve as a filter for the entire network, while at the same time maintaining the state for each of the connections on the network.

B. IEEE C37.118 protocol

The C37.118 protocol is used to gather synchronized phasor measurements to make better-informed decisions about the operation of the smart grid. Figure 1 shows the various types of C37.118 protocol messages. The PDC sends commands to the PMU, and the PMU in turn sends a configuration frame specifying the format of the data frames that would follow after that. Header frames can contain any sort of human-readable information (i.e., plain-text).



Fig. 1: Flow of messages for the C37.118 protocol.

In the initial state of the PMU, only Command frames are valid. Receiving a Command frame requesting a Header or Configuration packet causes the machine to temporarily accept a single packet of the appropriate type. Due to the complexities of simultaneous communication, this packet need not be the next one received. Instead, the machine will continue accepting valid packets of any type until it receives the one requested, then stop accepting those packets until a second Command packet requests them.

At any point, receiving a Command frame requesting data causes Data frames to be accepted as valid, until a Command

[1]The source code of our system is available at https://github.com/Dartmouth-Trustlab /C37.118PMU.

frame ending data is received, at which point all Data frames are rejected.

C. Security of Wide Area Measurement Systems

Intrusion detection in wide area measurement systems has been widely studied. Yang et al. propose an intrusion detection mechanism specific to the C37.118 protocol [8]. Their technique involved making use of a heterogeneous whitelist of known attacks, and a behavior-based approach to detect unknown ones. Stewart et al. provide a very comprehensive set of guidelines to describe what approach is to be taken by operators to ensure confidentiality, data integrity and availability of the grid [9]. Stewart et al. also note that the specifications of the C37.118 protocol do not include any security features, and that it is left to the network layers to enforce the security. The paper also provides several results demonstrating the effectiveness of the safeguards. Although the paper goes in depth about substation security and information security, Stewart et al. do not discuss the issue of input handling in the PMUs.

Coppolino et al. conducted a study of synchrophasor devices (PMU) and phasor data concentrators (PDC) [10]. Coppolino et al. note that telnet was being used to perform a lot of management tasks, and this is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. Also, there was no input validation or sanitization in the PDC application that they examined, which was the open source OpenPDC application. The content of the messages were usually not verified, and the authors note that a host of input validation attacks and bugs are possible including SQL injection and buffer overflows. The authors recognize that the issue of input validation exists in the PDCs and PMUs, but do not talk about ways this could be addressed.

Another important source of motivation for our work is looking at past list of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) and understanding why these errors occurred. In the database we find three CVEs that are specific to the C37.118-2 communication system and PMUs [11], [12], [13]. CVE-2013-2800 and CVE-2013-2801 signify exactly the same problem we are trying to address in this paper. These bugs would expose the devices to a host of memory corruption and denial-of-service attacks. The most valid action would be to reject these messages since they are malformed, and don't satisfy the grammar of the protocol. Prior to the security investigation of DNP3 implementations by Chris Sistrunk and Adam Crain [2], the DNP3 CVE list had just one reported vulnerability. The researchers found over 30 vulnerabilities through their investigations in 2013-2014. We anticipate that a similar investigation of the C37.118 protocol would reveal several more of these vulnerabilities.

III. Approach

We are using a principled approach to build a high-assurance input validator, and provide it in a way that operators of constrained edge devices do not have to bother about the performance and CPU time. We want to do this by placing these parsers optimally on a level higher on the hierarchical structure followed by wide area measurement systems, and sometimes in the edge device itself when the PMU is known to be sending and receiving critical data.



Fig. 2: Overall architecture of PhasorSec. A single substation contains multiple PMUs, which are synchronized using a GPS clock. These PMUs communicate with a single PDC at the substation, which then aggregates data to a PDC in the control center. This diagram shows the placement of PhasorSec in a substation network in the control center.

Our development effort of PhasorSec was divided into three broad parts. First, we build the LangSec parsers for the IEEE C37.118 protocol for the revision of 2011. Second, we introduce PhasorSec as a bump-in-the-wire on a substation network. Finally, we find the most optimal location to place PhasorSec based on the importance of the PMUs and the network topology. Figure 2 demonstrates the purpose of PhasorSec in a substation network.

A. Designing PhasorSec

The LangSec methodology involves a critical reading of the protocol specification to be able to extract information that is needed to build parsers. We start by understanding what states follow in the protocol, and the messages that are to be accepted by each of these states. The architecture of our parsing methodology can be seen in Figure 3. A clear and direct correlation between the packet format diagram, the grammar and the code validating this grammar is necessary, and is the goal of LangSec, since it helps programmers and auditors alike.

We make use of the Hammer parser combinator toolkit to both describe our extracted grammar for each state of the C37.118 protocol, and at the same time implement a parser for the protocol. Our coding style makes the C/C++ code more clean and concise, and more readable that the pointer arithmetic-based parsing code usually written.

Extracting the session language: To understand how the parser must be built, we need to understand the exact order in which the messages are sent and received. In some cases, messages that aren't supposed to appear one after the other or in a certain order may appear so, and the session language must be able to reject such messages. Figure 1 shows the communication between the PMU and the PDC from which we can extract the individual state machines for both the PMU and the PDC. Figure 2 also shows the session language or the protocol state machine for an individual PDC.



Fig. 3: Parsing methodology in PhasorSec. For protocols involving complex session languages and states, we would first perform a well-formedness check to make sure the message overall conforms to the specification of the protocol, and only then parse the message with respect to the current state of the system.

Extracting grammar from specification: Usually all protocol specifications have clear descriptions of what are the various packet formats. The specifications also include some critical information such as what the boundaries of the various parts of the payload are, and which fields depend on other fields. Context-sensitivity must usually be avoided, and we advocate that we must stick to the easily recognizable regular and context-free languages. A LangSec analysis of the specification would reveal such issues as pitfalls in the specification of protocols [14]. Below is the grammar we were able to extract for the C37.118 protocol. A well-formed PMU frame can comprise any of the four frame types. One thing to note in the config_frame description is that the Station_config field repeats NUM_PMU times. This leads to a complexity in parsing, since this value NUM_PMU has to first be extracted, following which the rest of the packet has to be extracted. The same occurs for the fields PHUNIT, ANUNIT and DGUNIT which all depend on the previous values PHNMR, ANNMR and DGNMR for their lengths.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{config\_frame} &\rightarrow \text{Header NUM\_PMU Station\_config}^{*} \\
\text{Header} &\rightarrow \text{sync framesize idcode soc} \\
&\quad\ \text{fracsec time\_base} \\
\text{Station\_config} &\rightarrow \text{name id\_code FORMAT} \\
&\quad\ \text{PHNMR ANNMR DGNMR} \\
&\quad\ \text{PHUNIT ANUNIT DGUNIT options} \\
\text{options} &\rightarrow \epsilon \mid \text{options DATA\_RATE} \mid \\
&\quad\ \text{options CHKSUM}
\end{aligned}
$$

Well-formedness check: We build recognizers for the chosen protocol, and recognize the overall syntax of the message, without actually taking into consideration the session state the receiver is in. This check is really important, since there are some semantic actions involved in checking whether a receiver is in a certain state, and making sure the correct parser is being run on it. When a device is on the receiving end of a stream of completely malformed and invalid messages, these messages get rejected directly at this step without being subject to any semantic actions hence saving CPU time and memory. The placement of the well-formedness check in the code can be seen in Figure 3.

```
header = h_sequence(h_uint16(), h_uint16(), h_uint16(),
    h_uint32(), h_uint32(), h_uint32(), NULL);
station_config = h_sequence(name, id, format, phnmr, annmr,
      dgnmr, phunit, anunit, dgunit, options, NULL);
options = h_sequence(h_optional(h_uint16()),
    h_optional(h_uint16()), NULL);
initial_parse = h_sequence(header, h_uint16(), NULL);
next_parse = h_repeat_n(station_config, num_pmu);
```

Fig. 4: The Hammer-based code for handling the C37.118 configuration frame as described in the grammar above.

Parsing based on the session state: Once the message is checked for overall syntactic validity in the well-formedness check, we check which state our system is in, and deploy that particular parser to be run on the given input to make sure that the message we received is not just structurally correct, but also valid with respect to the current state our system is in. In the C37.118 protocol, the data frame parsers need to be built based on the configuration frame that was received previously. Figure 3 describes how each state of the system has a parser of its own, that gets called if a message was received in that particular state. Figure 4 shows a snippet of how the grammar in the previous section translates directly to a parser in our code snippet written in C.

PhasorSec as a bump-in-the-wire. One of the bigger goals of PhasorSec is to make sure that all the C37.118 packets in our scope goes through our parsers, and no device receives a packet that has not been parsed by one of our parsers. To introduce PhasorSec as a bump in the wire, we perform the following:

- The PhasorSec device performs an *arpspoof* on the PMUs telling them that it is the PDC, and the vice versa to the PDC.
- We use *scapy* to recover the packets the PDC is sending or receiving.[2]
- The state of each of the connection is maintained in the form of a finite state machine, and the correct parser is called.

In case of failure to parse a message, PhasorSec logs the message after dropping the packet. If the parsing is successful, PhasorSec forwards it on to the recipient.

B. Deployment

Applications that depend on synchrophasor data often have real time requirements in the order of seconds. Meeting these demands can be hard and hence security considerations are often ignored in the pursuit of performance requirements.

[2]Scapy helps us manipulate packets on the wire - https://scapy.net/

In deploying PhasorSec, we hope to guarantee end to end delay requirements while providing input validation. Another constraint is the strict security budget that utilities have which makes it expensive to deploy and manage a filter per network link. In Section IV we show that PhasorSec adds a network overhead in the order of a few microseconds and hence even if we were to deploy a filter on every network link, the end to end delay requirements for even the most time critical of applications will not be exceeded. Hence, we define the problem of deploying PhasorSec as maximizing the number of links that are monitored by a filter while guaranteeing that the budget is met [15].

We represent the WAMS network as an undirected graph $G = (W \cup N, L)$, where W is the set of WAMS devices and N is the set of network infrastructure nodes. L is the set of links at which PhasorSec can be deployed.

Objective function: Not all network links are created equal i.e. some links carry data from PMUs that provide more valuable measurements than other PMUs. Thus, we can assign an importance to each network link. Let $w(l_i)$ be the importance of link i. The objective of PhasorSec deployment is then to maximize coverage of the most important links.

Deployment Cost: The cost of deploying the network appliance is affected not just by the cost of the appliance itself but also the cost of installation which can vary significantly due to geographical location or accessibility of the substation. Let $c(S_j)$ be the cost of placing a filter on a set of links $S_j \subseteq L$.

Hence, the formal definition of deployment is given by the following equation where $x_i = 1$ if link l_i is selected and $y_j = 1$ if a set S_j of links is chosen.

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{maximize} && \sum w(l_i)x_i \\ &\text{subject to} && \sum C(S_j)y_j \leq B; \\ &x_i \in \{0,1\}; \\ &y_j \in \{0,1\}; \end{aligned}$$

Note that this is reformulation of the budgeted maximum coverage problem which is NP-hard [16]. There exists a $1 - \frac{1}{e}$ approximation algorithm to solve the problem [16]. It turns out that the greedy algorithm achieves the best approximation ratio.

IV. Evaluation

We evaluate our parsers using three broad validation techniques. We performed a static analysis on our system, we fuzz-tested our system, wrote unit tests, and performed CPU-time analysis.

A. Unit Testing, Static Analysis and Coverage

We make use of the *Infer* tool to perform a static analysis of our system [17]. Our implementation was found to not have any of the categories of errors found by *infer*, namely, null de-references, memory leaks, premature nil termination arguments and resource leaks.

Type	Lines	Percentage
Line Coverage	364/485	75.1%
Function Coverage	31/34	91.2%

TABLE I: Code coverage of the C37.118 parser using *gcov* and *lcov*. This shows the number of lines and functions that could be reached by our unit testing suite.

Parser	Total Run-time	Crashes	Hangs	Cycles
Configuration Frame	25 hours	0	37	9452
Data Frame	25 hours	0	42	10300

TABLE II: A summary of our AFL fuzz-testing results.

We used a set of unit tests to test our implementation of the C37.118 protocol. To validate our unit testing technique, we used *gcov* to assess the code coverage of our implementation. The results of our coverage are in Table I.

B. Fuzzing

We make use of coverage-guided fuzz-testing using the *American Fuzzy Lop* fuzzer (AFL). Figure 5 shows that we ran AFL on the configuration frame parser. Our results show that after 25 hours of fuzzing, there were no crashes. Although there were several hangs, these were mostly due to the fact that our parser was stateful.

C. Timing Analysis

The experiments were run on an Firefly Development Board with a Quad-core ARM Cortex-A17 processor and 2GB of RAM.

Frame	CPU Time	Lines of code
Command Frame	20 μs	29
Configuration Frame	13 μs	71
Data Frame	27 μs	56
Header Frame	80 μs	30

TABLE III: We compare the time taken to parse each of the frames and the number of lines of code in each of these parsers.

We perform CPU-time analysis on the individual parsers, to understand the overhead which would be introduced. The



Fig. 5: AFL Fuzzer screenshot showing results of fuzz-testing of our configuration parser written in hammer.



Fig. 6: AFL did not detect any crashes and had only two unique hangs after over 24 hours of testing for both the configuration frame and command frame parsers.

command frame and the header frame would have to be parsed at the PMU, and the configuration and data frames would be parsed at the PDC which aggregates the data from multiple PMUs. In Table III, we see that the overhead due to the addition of these parsers is very minimal (in the order of micro-seconds) considering that it prevents input-handling vulnerabilities and bugs. We also note that the complex parser we have written was for the configuration frame, which contains the context needed for the data frames to parse the data correctly. Despite performing stateful parsing, we note that we can construct these parsers in under 75 lines of code each.

V. Conclusion

We showed that a context-aware parser can be built for the C37.118 parser, that is not only resilient to state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques such as AFL, but also does not add much overhead to the devices.

We started with a critical reading of the specification of the IEEE C37.118 protocol, understanding what devices are included in the protocol, and at the same time understanding the syntax and semantics of the messages. We implemented individual parsers for the different messages, that first look at the overall syntax of the message, and then look at the context of the device based on the previous messages.

Although our current design is inspired from our discussions with domain experts, we anticipate that the substation networks are moving slowly towards software-defined networking. In our future work, instead of using an ingress-based network appliance, we would instead like to move to software switches based on P4 [18]. To improve usability of *hammer*, we will also explore using domain specific languages to improve the usability of the parser building methodology.

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